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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
\YILBERT J. DAWSON,
Appellant,
vs.
BO.A.RD OF EDUCATION OF
\VEBER COUNTY SCHOOI_j
DISTRICT and GUY ELIAS
CARR,
Defendants,

No. 7391 ·

\V·. ED BINGHAM,

Respondent.
'

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF F ACT·S
.A.ppellant's state1nent of the case is somewhat incoinplPt<~ as "\Yell as inaccurate, ·and therefore, we prefer
to 1nake a further staten1ent.
The aeti ()Jl "\Yas brought to recover damages for the
death of a n1inor child, J...Ja\Yrence P. Da\vson, age nine
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yE~nrs,

a third grade ~tudent (Tr. 106), \Yho died as a
re~ult of an auton1ohile accident ~1ay 7, 1948, about 4:30
P. l\1. ( 'J~ r. 35). The nan1ed def en dan ts in the case ";<ere
,V. Ed Binghan1, the driver of the school bus on \vhich
· <lecE~a~e(l ro<lP to and fron1 school, and Guy Elias Carr,
\Vho \Yas driYing his O\\Tn private automobile, a 1948
liudson cluh eoupe. Binghan1 drove north on Highw·ay
U 38 (a t\vo-lane high,vay with gravel shoulders, east of
\Vhieh "rere grass and brush tw·elve to fourteen inches
high), and stopped the bus on the graveled shoulder on
the southeast corner of the intersection of High,vay U 38
and 4800 South, an east and west street, and had discharged several ehildren east of the bus on the graveled
shoulder.
Deceased, who lived west of the highway, left the
other children ( Tr. 195), started west across the highway
about twelve feet in front of the bus (Tr. 118) being
struck by defendant Carr's autom:obile at a place on the
concrete northw.est from the left front of the bus (Tr. 29,
43) (See Exhibit "A'.'). There was some conflict as to
\vhether he "\vas running (Tr. 254). Most of the witnesses
described him as walking in a stiff-legged manner, as he
often did (Tr. 96, 101, 104, 112, 119). The body can1e to
rest sixty-three feet north of the point of impact on or
near the east shoulder, (Tr. 26, 27, 57) Carr's automobile
f-'topping t''Tenty-five to thi1·(y feet beyond that (Tr. 200,
234).

Defendants "'Tpre sued UT)Oll the theory of joint and
coneurren t negligence (sec paragraph fj ve of plan tiff'~
c-on1plaint, ~ r. 001).
1
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Contrary to the staten1ents of appellant, th<? evidence
"·as undisputed that the bus u·as sfo,pp.ed zc~ithin a designated b~t s sf op. \Yhich \vas posted \Yi thin the confines of
t'Yo ~tation signs reading, Srhool Bus Station". One of
thv~P ~igu~ \Yn~ facing north for southbound traffic ou
thP "·e:'t side of High,vay l: 38, and the other "\vas facing
~uuth (that i~, facing northbound traffic) on the east
~ide, each being about one hundred yards fron1 '''"here the
hn:-: "~as stopped (Tr. 38, 188).
H

Like,vise, :JI r. Binghan1 Icas uot stopped in the lane
of traffic. The paved portion of the high"'Tay \Yas ·eighteen
feet (Tr. 20-21) \Yith three feet of asphalt or blacktop on
each side, 1naking each traveling lane about ten and a
half feet wide. The bus w_as stopped entirely off the paved
portion, the \vest side of the bus being according to the
patrohnan 's n1easure1nents, eight inches east of the east
edge of the asphalt ( Tr. 21, 22, 37 and 39).
The evidence "Tas therefore uncontradicted that
defendant Bingha1n did not violate the provisions of
Chapter 2, paragraph 2-2 (a) and (b) of the State Road
Com1nission providing that:
''The bus shall not pick up or let off students
except at regularly designated stops.''

and
''The bus shall not be stopped in line of traffice- to load or unload pupils."
The only cont1"1oversy as to the defendant Bingham
clnd only possible r lain1 of negligence as to hin1 "\vas
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whether he violated the ter1ns of the follovving reguation,
paragraph 2-2 (c)_ providing that:
''The driver shall require all pupils to pass
behind rather than in front of the bus.''
In this connection, Mr. Binghan1 testified:
''At this particular corner and many points
along my route, I have instructed the children to
be very careful crossing the highway, to look both
ways on this particular corner, and I instructed
the children to remain to the rjght hand side of'
the bus until I pulled away. Out to the right hand
side of the bus and remain there until I had pulled
on down the highway. I felt that gives them a
better opportunity to see the high"\\ray both ways.''
(Tr. 193-4.)
He repeated these instructions almost every night (Tr.
130, 235, 239).
There was testimony that the children had not previously passed in front of the bus (Tr. 195, 203), but
stood clear until the bus pulled away (Tr. 145). Deceased
had ridden the bus .two years, since Septen1ber of 1947
(Tr. 101).
There was no particular place within the bus stop
area designated to stop the bus (Tr. 188). While Binghan1
someti1nes stopped on the north side of 4800 South, east
of the intersection, when he took the alternate route to
deliver three children living in the Cozydale area, when
these children "\Yere not present, he ren1ained on U 38,
ordinarily stopping vvhere he did on this occasion (Tr.
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186, 187 ~ :2:.?7 ~ :.?8-!, :238) ~ although hP occasionally stopped
north of the inter~Pction ( Tr. 238). This lattPr position,
how'eYPr, "~n8- less convenient to the children because of
the bru~h and "\Yillo"~~ along the Pntire side of the bus
(Tr. :~7. -!G. 143~ :216). On the southeast eornPr, therP "\Ya~
\Yet grass and "·eeds t\YelYe to fourteen inches high ( Tr.
:23, 34, ~i7). To avoid these, the bus "\Yas so stopped that
the front end extended into the south portion of 4800
~outh. so that the children con1ing out of the· bus door
had a clear place to alight on the gravel just north of
the brush (Tr. 36, 46) and there ';vas a little strip of clear
space bet,veen the east side of the bus and the brush ( Tr.
39, 40) through \Yhich the children could pass to the
rear of the bus, or they c:ould have gone through the
\Yeeds and grass ( Tr. 139), or 'vaited till the bus pulled
a'vay .
..._\.s to defendant Carr, the e"vidence showed that as
h P. Ca IT, drove north, he had a clear view of the sch-ool
1n1~. a large bus yello"v in color, with ''School Bus''
printed on the rear ( Tr. 30, 38, 68). He saw the school
bus station (Tr. 246-7), knew it was a school bus stop
(Tr. 263), and anticipated there would be a bus there
( Tr. 247). He expected children fron1 the bus Inight be
crossing the high,vay or dart out fron1 the bus (Tr. 262).
It 'vas undisputed that he did ·not sound his horn (Tr.
191, 23G). There "\Vas substantial evidence of speed at
t\Yent~·-five to thirty 1uiles per hour in a tw-enty n1ile zone
(Section G7 -7-113 ( 1) ( Tr. 193). The physical facts confinn Pel a higher rate of speed, because if he had been going
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fourteen to sixteen n1iles per hour as testified to by hiln,
he could have stopped in thirty feet (Tr. 108-109).
The jury returned a verdict in the an1oun t of $5,000
against the deftJlldant Carr, and a verdict of no cause of
action against the defendant, W. Ed Binghan1 (Tr. 346).
The judgn1ent against the defendant Carr 'vas not
resisted, and the judgn1ent, including costs against said
defendant Carr, was paid in full and a satisfiction of
judgment duly entered (Tr. 0028). (See also appellant's
acknowledgn1ent thereof, page 3 Appellant's Brief, and
stipulation filed herein in connection with respondent's
1notion to dis1niss the appeal.)

QUESTIONS ON APPEAL
The only errors claimed by appellant are those
relating to the court's instructions. By . our motion to
dismiss, we have added a further question for eonsideration by the court, which if well taken, makes
unnecessary passing on the merits.

Questions
We have separated the issues as follo"\\rs:
I. As to respondent's n1otion to disn1iss, does payment of the judgn1ent in full by the defendant Carr
extinguish the alleged cause of action against the defendant Binghan1 ~
II. Did the eourt eonnnit revPrsible error in it~
instruction~ to the jury, or in refu~ing certain reqnP~tP<l
instrn('tion~ of plaintiff?
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I.

. .\R-GlTniENr"r .L\XD . .\lTTHORITIES ON MOTION
TO DIS1LISS _._\PPEAL
This court ha~ held that "·here it appears that any
furthPr prosecution of the 1natter involved in the appeal
'Yould be ··fictitious and fruitless,'' the appeal "rill be
disn1issed .
.An~erica u

( eJne ut & Plaster Co. v. Epperson,
79 Utah 63, 77 Pae. 2nd 581.
1

See also:
Colman v. N etv Y o1~k Life, (Okla.) 44 Pac.
(2d) 880;
Srenska etc. v. Weber, (Cal.) 51 Pac. (2d) 65;
Lane v. Insurance ·c·o., (l(ans.) 8 Pac. (2d)
403.

There can be no dispute. as to the facts relating to
the 1notion to dis1niss. Defendants "'"ere charg-ed in the
co1nplaint as joint tort feasors, for in paragraph five
( Tr. 001) it is alleged :
''That by reason of the joint and concurrent
negligent operation of the school bus by the defendant
Ed Bingha1n, together with his negligence in per1nitting said child Lawrence P. Dawson to go around the front of said school bus into
and upon said highway, contrary to law and to
the rules and regulations of the State of Utah,
and the negligent operation of said automobile by
the defendant Guy Elias Carr, and as the proxiJuate result thereof, injuries "'"Pre inflicted upon
thP ~aid child T..Ja,vrence P. Da,Yson, deceased, of

' T·
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such a character as to cause and which did cause
his death on the 8th day of May, 1948."
The verdicts against defendant Carr and in favor
of defendant Binghan1 speak for themselves (Tr. 00140015 ), as does also the satisfaction of judg1nent (Tr.
0028). On thr- face of the record, the appellant has no
right vvhatever to prosecute this action further, or to
1naintain any action, against respondent Bingha1n.
Payn1ent of a judgn1ent by one of two joint defendants operates as a satisfaction and extinguishn1ent of
the judg1nent as to all, regardess of the intention of the
parties to the transaction, and even \vhere the judg1nent
is against joint tort feasor.s. 34 C. J. 689.
In Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 120 Fed. (2d)
746, 135 A. L. R. 1494, the action \Vas to recover for the
death of the plaintiff's intestate, vvho was killed while
in the employ of a pipe line service company, while repairing a .gas pipe line owned by the defendant. It appeared that plaintiff had previously brought an action
against the deceased's employer, and in that action had
executed a contract compromising the claim against such
en~ployer upon payment to her of a stipulated sun1 and
releasing such employer from all liability. The settleJnent agreen1ent contained a provision that the plaintiff
\Vas 'asserting a claiu1 for the death of the intestate
against the defendant oil con1pany \Yhich \Yas a joint
tort feasor \Yith the defendant in the case in \Yhich the
settleinent vvas Inade, but that such settlen1ent \Vas 1nade
in the former case without prejudice to plaintiff's rights
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to proceed again8t the oil co1npany a~ a joint tort feasor.
The judgn1ent \Yhich \YRS entered upon the con1pr,o1nise
agr~eutent \Ya~ paid in fulL and the court held that. sueh
il:1ylnt\nt extingni~hP(l the plaintiff'~ rights and cau~e
of action~ and that t.llP court had no po\Yer to reserve
any ~o-l·alled riy:ht~ of thP plaintiff to proseeute the
present ~nit. The eourt in its opinion ren1arked:
· · _..\._ person injured by a joint tort has a single and indivisible cause of action. He 1nay proceed against the \Yrongdoers either jointly or
seYerally and 1nay recover a judgn1ent or judgments against all, but he can have but one satisfaction of his single cause of action. Neither may
he split his cause of action. The administratrix
n1ight haYe entered into a compromise with McGeorge, disnrissed her action against him, released l\'lcGeorge or covenanted not to sue 'McGeorge and reserved her right to sue Sinclair and
Gray.
''Instead of following that course, the administratrix elected to enter into the contract compron1ising and settling her two single causes of
action, received the sum stipulated in s.atisfaction
thereof, and submitted the compromise to the
court for its approval. The eourt by its judgment
approved the comprise and ,the settlement of the
t1Yo causes of action and dismissed the action with
prejudice. The judgment had the same effect as
though it had been entered in favor of the administratrix for the stipulated an1ount and had then
b(_len satisfied upon the payn1ent of that an1ount .
.T ohnstonc v. Chap1nan, 79 Ore. 67 4, 156 Pac. 286,
288 .
. . rrllt' pffect of the settlernent and corrlpron1ise
of the~ causes of action, the receipt of the sum
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stipulated, the judgrnent approving the eoHlproHlise of the causes of action and disn1issing the
action \vith prejudice w·as an extinguishn1ent of
the tv\c-o single causes ·of action. The causes of
action having been extinguished, the District
·Court of Sen1inole County, Oklahorna, \vas po,verless to reserve the right in the administratrix to
prosecute another suit on the san1e causes of action against Sinclair and Gray.''
In Cain v. Quanuah Light & Ice Co., (Okla.) 267 Pac.
641, the court declarPs :
''In the instant case, plaintiff procured a
prior judgment and obtained full satisfaction
thereof, which satisfaction operates not only as a
release to the Gypsum Company, but as a complete settlement of the cause of action. In the
cases· cited by plaintiff, the claims were not reduced to judgrnent and settlement and release
were made prior to judgment. There was no settlement of the cause of action. * * * The plaintill having no legal right to split her cause of
action, the court by its judgment could not legally
grant such right."
In Vattani v. Do1'niano., (N. J.) 153 Atl. 841, the action was for the death of plaintiff's intestate '":bile riding
in an auton1obile ,,·hich collided \Yith a railroad train.
It appeared that a judgrnent had been obtained against
the railroad eo1npany· in another action arising out of
the san1e accident and had been satisfied, "Thich judgrnen t had been entered lH~f o rc\ n ju1·)· in open eon rt hy
consent and stivulatJ.on. The judg1nent containPd a proYision that satisfaction thPreof ~hould be \Yithout preju-
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dice to the rig·ht of the plaintiff to 1naintain an action
again~t nn~T other joint or seYeral tort feasors for dalnage~ rP~nlting heeau~e of the death of plaintiff's intf\~
ta te. The XP\Y J er~ey court used this language :
•· ''nere here \Yt\ haYe the case 'vhere it appears that the parties did not intend that the judgInent should be satisfaction, \Ye are n1et 'vith the
conclusion of la". that the judgn1ent is in fact a
detern1ina tion that the lia.bili ty is satisfied. It
seen1s to me, therefore, that the reservation contained in the judgn1ent is nugatory, as it would
in fact nullify the judgn1ent itself.''
In Tr etu1nka Y. CT ronncell Franklin Oil Co., (9kla.)
4:3 Pac. ( 2d) 434, the n1unicipality brought a suit against
a nnn1ber of oil and gas companies for pollution of its
\Yater supply, and a judgment 'vas entered against some
of the defendants for $65,000.00, but the case was .not
disposed of as to the appellee, Crom"rell Franklin Oil
Con1pany. A journal entry, however, provided:
''Plaintiff be, and it hereby is allowed to further prosecute its cause of action against all defendants named in this action, except those named
and listed hereinabove, and such right is hereby
reserved to said plaintiff.''
The defendants against whom the judgn1ent "ras rendered satisfied it, and the court held that by such satisfaction, the cause of action was extinguished and the
CronnYell Frankin Oil Co1npany 'vas released fron1 its
joint liahility ':v-ith the defendants w·ho paid the judgn1ent.
're are not unn1indful of Title 47, Utah Code AnnoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tated 1943, relating to joint obligations, and particularly
SPrtion 47-0-4, \Yhich provides :
'' 47-0-4. Release of Coobligor-Reservation
of Rights.
Subject to the provisions of section 47-0-3,
the obligee's rPlease or discharge of one or n1or<'
of several obligors, or of one or n1ore of joint
or of joint and several obligors, shall not discharge coobligors against 'vhon1 the obligee in
'vriting and as parto f the sa1ne transaction as
the release or discharge expressly reserves his
rights; and in the absence of such a reservation
of rights shall discharge coobligors only to the
extent provided in section 47-0-5. ''
However, this statute 1nust be construed ~ith reference
to other elen1ents or factors "rhich are not specifically
mentioned therein. The fact that the statute is specific
that
''Release or discharge of one or n1ore several
obligors, or one or n1ore joint or several obligors
shall not discharge coobligors against whom the
obligee in writing and as part of the san1e transaction as the release or discharge expressly reserves his rights.''
should not be construPcl to preyent the full and eolnplPtP
operation of such a release as to all joint tort feasors,
if a plaiHtiff has been fully co1npensated for his injury
by one of the joint tort feasors. This court has declared
that:
"There can be but one satisfaction for inJUries sustained in one \Yroug." Green v. Lau,rJ,
- - Utah
, 206 Pac. (2d) 626.
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nnd it quote~ \Yith npproYal Greeuhalch vs Shell O-il
7S :B-,ed. ( 2d) ~l+~.

()o.,

In th~ GrPPnhaleh ense, tht} Circuit Court of _..\p}H~al~ for tht) Tt'nth Circuit co1nineuts quite at ]pugth
npon tlH~ tTtah ~tatnte, rPf0rs to its uncertainties and
t·Inpha~izt~~ thn t the rP~erYation in a release of a right to
proceed again:st other tort ftlnsor~ ean only operate ''if
full con1pen:sntion has not been reeeived," and it interprets Section -±7 -0-3 to 111eau that "no cause of action
reu1ains if full con1pensation for the injury is received.''
In .A.nlerican Law Institttte Restatenzent, Torts, Vol.
4, Sec. 886, it is said :
"The discharge or satisfaction of a judgInent against one of several persons, each of who1n
is liable for a single harn1, discharges each of the
others from liability therefor."
and in the conunent upon this section, it is said:
''This is true where no judgment has been
obtained against the other tort feasors, where
judgments have been obtained against the other
tort feasors, even for the same amount or for larger amounts in separate actions, and where judgl'nents have been obtained against the others in the
sa1ne action. The rule n pplies \Yhere the t·ort ';vas
the act of one of thein, for \Y'hich the othPrs \Yere
liable, \Yhere all acted in concert, and where the
act of each \Yas 1nerely a contributing factor to
thP \\ holP. It is innna terial vYhether the onP paying \Ya~.;, \Yith ref(·n·nce to the one \\·ho has not
paid, pri1narily or secondarily liable.''
7

In

~llcTi.que

v. Lery, :2:3 N.Y. S. (2d) 114, it

i~
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that the receipt of payment by the judgn1ent creditor
on a judgment was held to discharge all tort feasors
who might be liable to the plaintiff for the same tort, and
th<) effect of the satisfied judgn1ent, operating as a disrlui.rg·e of th<} others, 'vas not altered by the execution of
an i1.1~tru1nent \\Thich purported to release the wrongdo<_~r against '"hom -plaintiff had obtained satisfaction,
but expressly reservPd her right to proceed against the
other. The Ne'" York statute provides:
''The recovery of a judgment without sa tis. faction is not a bar to the institution of an action
against others who are jointly liable,''
'Yhich is the lavv in this State 'vithout express enactment,
and "There the judgment is satisfied, such satisfaction
extinguishes the cause of action as to all joint tort
feasors, even. though the statute contains no such express
prOVISIOn.
N o"T, the question here IS : Has the plaintiff been
fully con1pensated?
In the trial of this cause, the 1neasure of damages
1'(-'('0Yerable is defined in Instruction 29 ( rr. 008) to
'Yhich instruction the appellant has taken no exception.
If the jury had found against respondent, it would have
hPen contl'olled in the fixing of dan1ages by said instruction the sa1ne as it was controlled in its verdict against
Carr. In other '\Tords, Carr and Bingham being charged
as joint tort fea.sors 'vhose "joint and concurrent" negligence is alleged to have been the proximate cause of the
injuries co1nplained of, it must be assumed that $5,000.00
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thP lll:lxinnnn a1nount \rhieh the jury eonsidered to
reprP~l)nt the ron1pen~ntory daltU1f?;l)~ to W'hieh the plaintiff \ra~ t:)ntitled~ and thi~ i~ truP PYen though the jury
found that Binghau1 \Yas not liable. It, of course, cannot be n~sn1ned that under the sa1ne in8truction as to the
Ineasnn~ of dau1agl1 ~~ the jury \rould or eould hold Binghaul for any greatt)r liability than Carr, for the 1neasure
of da1nag~ is not affected by the quality of the act of
either defendant. The rule as to such n1easure of dan1age is applicable no 1natter "~hat the alleged acts of negligenee of either or both defendants, and \Yhen the plaintiff accepted payn1ent of such con1pensation, it V\Ta.s in
full of his clai.J.n and extinguished his cause of artion as
agai11st both tort feasors.
The

~lotion

to Dis1niss the appeal should be granted.

II
BRIEF ON THE MERITS
Appellant assigns as error, the trial court's refusal
to give appellant's requested instructions numbered .13;
14, 19, 27~ 28, 31, 32 and 33 (Br. pp. 3-6), and that he
~~rred in giving instructions nun1bered 12, 13, 14 and 15
(Br. p,p. 6-7).
Appellant's Requested Instructions Refttserl

instruction No. 13 (_.A.ppellant's Brief p.
:~) ( Tr. 003) is erroneous because it vYould require the
.i nr~· to find in favor of the plaintiff and against defenJ~t>que~ted
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dant Bingham, merely on the basis of Binghan1's negligence, whether or not such negligence was the proximate
cause o.f the injuries to the Davvson boy. Negligence alone
is not sufficient upon 'vhich to predicate liability. It
1nust be a proxi1nate cause of the injury, and the requested instruction was fatally defective. Beyerle v.
( ?ift, (Cal.) IIearing denied by Supreme Court, 209
Pac 1014; LaRue v. Powell (Cal.) Hearing denied by
Supren1e Court, 42 Pac. ( 2d) 1063.
Furthern1ore, thP court did by its instructions nm11bered 14 ( Tr. 093 and 325) and 21 ( Tr. 0001 and 327)
instruct the jury in substance as requested by plaintiff.
The instructions given 'vere in the particular complained
of even n1ore favorable to appellant than requested since
the court's instruction No. 14 read:
,

''You are instructed that it was the duty of
the defendant, Ed Binghan1, to stop his bus in
such a position and at su~h a place to require the
children to pass behind rather than in front of
his bus. If you find fron1 the evidence that said
defendant did not ~o so, then you will find that
he vvas negligent.''

rrllt' court's instruetion

1'~ 0.

21

"~as

substantially the

l{C'f!UPstecl instruction N 6. 14 (App. Brief p. 3; Tr.
Oa4) is erroneous in several particulars. The request
reads:

''You are instructed that if you find from the
evidence that the defendant, \\T. Ed Binghan1, did
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not require thP deeensed child, Ln\Yl'Pnee f. Da\Yson, to pas~ behind ruther in front of the bus, that
said defendant \Yas guilty of n1isconduct as a
InattPr of la\v.' r:· pon ~uch a finding by you, you
are further in~tructed that that 1nisconduct on the
part of said defendant overco1nes any question
of contributor~T negligence on the part of the deeeased child, La\\"Tence P. l)a\\"Son, and you 'vill
then giYe no consideration \vhatever to any question of c.ontributory negligence on the part of said
child.''
This request is not only an in1proper application of
Section 37-7-177 of the Utah Code, but in effect would
1uake the bus driver absolute insurer of the safety of the
children after they \\~ere out of his control, a\vay fron1
the bus and irrespective of the independent intervening
negligent act of a responsible third party. The tern1
- ~ 1nisconduct'' as used by counsel is misleading in that
it \vas never the intention of the Legislature to abolish
the rule or principal on contributory negligence as to
\\Thich in this case the court \vith proper qualifications as
to the duty of a young boy very clearly instructed the
jury in its instr~ctions Nos. IX, X, XI, XVI and XXIII
(Tr. 091, 0003) and with respect to which appellant has
assigned no error.
flereafter ans\YPring the a1·gun1ents of counsel, \:Ve
further discuss this requested instruction.

lnstuctions Gil:eu by the CoruTt
.i\s to the instruetions given, of \Yhich con1plaint Is·

1nade, n1ay \\'"e say:
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Instruction No. 12 (p. 6 App. Brief; Tr. 324, 903)
w·as ilnproper· because there "\\Tas no evidence that re~
spondent stopped his bus in a pl~e not regularly designated as a bus stop, there ''Tas a bus stop sign \¥here he
stopped, and sueh had been a stopping place for years
before the date on which young Da\Yson was injured, with
nppl'oval_ of the School Board Superintendent (Tr. 227-).
Instruction No. 13 · (p. 6, App. Brief, Tr. 093, 325)
vvas proper, because there is no evidence that respondent stoppe_d his bus in the line of traffic.
Instruction No. 14 (p. 6 and 7, App. Brief, Tr. 093,
325 )" "\\rhile rather unfortunately worded (the duty "to
stop his bus in such a position as to require the children
to pass behind rather than in front''), such wording
was most favorable to appellant based upon appellant's
request.- The balance of. the instruction is certainly free
from error.
It is self-evident that instruction No. 15 is correct
as a 1natter of la\v, because he had a legal right and was
authorized to take the route along Highway U. 38, and
in taking that route, he stopped at a designated bus stop.
F\1rther1nore, the fact that he took such alternate route
\\eras not the proxilnate cause of the boy being run down.

Appellant's Arguntent
Referring no\Y to appelant's argun1ent, it would
seern that counsel is som.e\vhat confused. They contend
·in effect that Bingham's failure to direct the children,
including young Dawson, to go around the rear instead
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of the front of thP bus ". n s ~ "1nisconduet '' ; thn t '' tniseonduct,. · · i~ \YOl'~P than any gradt> of negl igt>nce and
in1plie8 'vilful \\"rung, \\·anton, rPckless conduct, or intPntioual violencP, '' and that contributor~· negligence
i~ no defe118e. \\""hile they contend that rt-sponclPnt 's
· ·u1i~eonduct'' \\·a~ lC'arse Ilia Jl negligence, they neverthele~~ nrgue that ~uch ""1ni~eonduct" ,,·as neglig,ence

per se .
..._\ppellant '~ reference t9 Section 37 ~7 -177 (p. 8 and
1:2 .._\pp. Brief), is 1nisleading· and does not quote the
entire section "\Yhich reads :
"57 -7-177.
Penalty.

Id. Violation of Regulations-

Any officer or employee of any school district
who violates any of the regulations provided for
in the next preceding section or fails to include
obligation to comply 'vith said regulations in any
contract executed by then1 on behalf of a school
district shall be guilty of n1isconduct and subject
to removal from office of employment. Any person operating a school bus under contract with a
school district who fails to comply with any said
regulations shall be guilty of breach of contract
-and such contract shall be cancelled after notice
and hearing by the responsible officers of such
~rhool district."
g,. thi~ and the preceding sec-tion the T_.jegislature \\·as
not nHdertaking to change the la\\· of negligence and
c-ontributory negligencP, nor \Yn~ it undertaking to define
undPr \\·hat condition~ a third party could rPCOYPr danlf.lg'(l~ frolll tlH dri\'Pl', but \\·as obYiou~1~· prP~eribiug a
1
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rule of discipline in the foru1 of ren1oval fron1 office
having application not only to the driver of a bus, but
\vi th respect to any of the nnn1erous en1ployees of the
sc-hool district and having respect to violation of any, of
the nu1nerous regulations, \vhether relating to the operation uf a bus or other,vise. By the ter1ns of the last
sentence of the section quoted, the driver is given an opportunity for notice and hearing before the responsible
officers of the school district before being found guilty of
breach of his contract or niisconduct.
"Misconduct" does not mean what counsel says it
1neans. ''Negligence'' is in a sense a form of '' Inisconduct'' and either may vary in degree as being sligh~,
ordinary or gross, depending upon the nature of the act.
''That tern1 is used does not change the nature ·of the
conduct. Funk and
agnall 's dictionary defines the
\Yord '' n1isc?nduct'' as '' In1proper conduct; bad behavior. Mismanage1nent and improper act. Instance of
1nisbehavior: Usually in the plural." Of course, misconduct 1night be casual or flagrant. It n1ight be n1ere indifference or it n1ight be intentional wrongdoing; but
no reasonable pcn~on \Yould contend that Binghan1, ':vho,
for eighteen years, had been entrusted \vith the transportation of childr(~n, \Yuuld \Yilfully, \vantonly and purposely
fail to instruct the1u to exercise proper care for their
safet~·, and the evidence sho,vs that it was his habit
and practice to do so. ( Tr. 194.) Any misconduct in
failing to give proper instructions, after notice and a
hearing, subjected him to ''removal from offce,'' but

''T
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sneh failure of duty on thP partieular day in question,
if he did so fail, cannot be regarded as a \vanton or vvilful act, \\"hieh eontributed to young Dawson's death,
e~peeially "·hen the boy and the group "\Yhich rode the
hus ':rith hin1 "\Yere repeatedly advised to ren1ain on the
right of the bus after alighting therefro1n until the
bus had 1uoved a"\Yay, '"hich instruction was an even
1nore effectiYe "\Yarning and direction than to instruct
the1u to pass around the rear, rather than the front of
the bus, for if they did not 1nove away after alighting
until the bus had gone, their vision "\Y'Ould be quite clear
a~ to traffic in either direction .
.A.s before stated, \Yhile counsel see1ned to contend

that Binghan1's alleged "misconduct" in failing to instruct the children to go around the rear rather than
the front of the bus, "\vas an act ''far beyond negligence
in scope," (Br. p. 12) they do not say just what "misconduct" is that "negligence" is not, as a basis for liability, and they cite Peterson v. Standard Oil Co., (Ore.)
106 Pac. 337, to the effect that the violation of a statute
or municipal ordinance enacted for public safety is negligence per se. Counsel might have cited authority nearer
home, for this Court has held that an affirmative act
in violation of some ordinances or statutes is negligence
per se. (Sntith v. Mine d!; Smelter Sttpply, 32 Utah 21,
88 Pac. 687; Jensen v. Utah Potuer &,Light Co., 42 Utah
415, 132 Pac. 8. However, \Ve have found no case ''"'hich
goes so far as to make '' n1isconduct,'' that is the mere
01nission of a bus driver to confor1n to a regulation that
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he ''require all pupils to pass behind rather than in front
of the bus," negligence per se or negligence at all, when
it appears fron1 the evidence that he custon1arily and
repeatedly gave the group of children, including young
J)a,,·son, an instiuction, far u1ore effective for their safety. The regulation does not specify \Yhen or· ho\Y often
the requirenH~nt n1ust be n1ade, and if respondent \vent
lH'~~ond this requirernent often enough so that the children should have co1ne custon1arily to avoid going in
front of the bus ( Tr. 195), ho\Y can it be said that it ';vas
a hreach of duty by Binghan1 that he did not happen,
on one particular day, technically to, instruct or require
then1 not to pass in front of the bus. Su-rely the word
''require" does not obligate the driver to use physical
force to compel the children to pass around the rear of
the bus especially after they are beyond his reach and
control. The objective of the regulation is the safety of
the _children, and \Yhat respondent had done by way of
instructions and \vhat the children understood to be his
requiren1ent that they stand by until the bus had n1oved
H\Ya~·, 1nore than co1nplied ''rith the regulation. H~ acted
ns any extra careful intelligent man "\vould -ordinarily
act. But if respondent's on1ission to ''require'' that the
ehildren pass around the rear of the bus (whatever that
1 nay n1ean) \YHs negligence ( \Yhich \\re deny), such negligencP \Yonld not he sufficient on \Yhich to predicate
liability unle~;:.: it \Yas a proxin1ate cause of the injury,
c-u1d a person charged \Yith such negligence could, of
c·our:-3e~ interpose the defense of contributory negligencP
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third pn rty. ()n both tht quP~tiou of proxitnate
ean~e and eoutributur HPglig( 1 ll<'P~ the jury \VH$ properly
in~tructed. and they fouud in faYor of rPspondent.
1

l -.OUll~Pl c.:ih d

:~8 ~\111.

J\11". pagp 854, 853 that •'t'Olltributory neglig(lnee i8 not a defence to nn action based
upon \vilful or "·anton 1nisconduct or intentional violenee. ''
( Br. p. 1j). Of eon r~P, that legal principle has no a pplication to the facts in thi.s case, because there is not a
~cintilla of proof that Bingha1n \Yas guilty of any wilful
or \Yanton nrisconduct, and counsel do not so allege. in
their con1plaint. They sin1ply allege that Binghan1 ''carelessly and negligenty allo\Yed and permitted said n1inor,
La \Yrence P. Da"yson, deceased, to proceed around the
front end of said bus into said high\vay U 38 in a vvesterly
direction, as a result of \Yhich the deceased child, La\vrence P. Da\vson, \\7 as struck etc." (Tr. 001). This is
nothing 1nore than the usual allegation of negligence,
and it does not in1ply any wanton or wilful act, and of
course~ contributory negligence may always be set up as
a defence against any kind of negligence, even if this
\vere negligence per se, \vhich we think it is not.
1

CONCI.JUSIO~

Finally, it appears from the record that defendants
Carr and Binghan1 ,,·ere sued as joint tort feasors; the
jury was properly instructed on proxin1ate cause, on
<·ontributory uPg-ligenee, and on the n1easure of dan1ages.
TJu· jury found that for the \\'rong done, Carr alone \vas
npg·lig<·nt, and that his negligence \Vas the proxi1nate
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cause of the injury, and that .$5,000 was the full an1ount
of compensation to which the paintiff was entitled according to the standard of con1putation fixed by the
court. The amount s·o fixed "\vas paid and accepted by the
plaintiff, and Carr was released. Such payn1ent and
rt~leace extinguished plaintiff's cause of action, and he
cannot take his full co1npensation and attempt to have
it duplicated. He cannot split his cause of action. If
he had chosen to reject the jury's award, he might then
hal'e con1e to this Court on appeal from the judgn1ent,
and he n1ight then have assigned error with respect to the
basis o~ each verdict, but having but one cause of action
and having accepted the awarded compensation for the
alleged wrong and co1npensated in full he cannot no"!
pursue respondent to recover again. We invite attention
to the authorities sub1nitted on the motion to dismiss the
appeal in support of our contention. In any event, the
judgn1en t should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
STEWART, CANNON &HANSON
E. F. BALD\~VIN, JR.
Atto!rneys for Respondent
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